A LL systems of distribution must have both economic and social sanctions in order to sur vive. Some systems of distribution have been specifically outlawed by federal antitrust legisla tion, such as cartels; other systems have been subjected to government regulation, such as the "natural" monopolies; while still others have either vanished or have seen their market position greatly reduced as an economic consequence of new forms of marketing. Examples are trading posts, yankee peddlers, general stores, and general-merchandise wholesalers.
Although much has been written about the ad vantages and disadvantages of franchising from both the franchisees' and the franchisors' perspec tives, no research has viewed franchising primari ly from a socioeconomic perspective. l Since fran chised businesses account for approximately 25% of consumer goods' expenditures,2 an inquiry into the socioeconomic implications of franchising seems imperative.
This article comments briefly on a definitional problem in franchising, and then evaluates some of the social and economic consequences of fran chising as a system of distribution. The data re sulted from a two-year investigation of "fast food," convenience grocery, and laundryIdry clean ing franchising which was funded by a grant from the Small Business Administration. a The study employed a probability'sample of approximately 1,000 completed questionnaires from franchisees. In addition, 151 franchise contracts and 146 com pleted questionnaires from franchisors were used in the study.
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The Socioeconomic Consequences of the Franchise System of Distribution What is Franchising?
The absence of an unambiguous definition of a franchise has been one of the problems which has plagued researchers of franchising. 4 The pres ent study employed the following definition to denote a franchise relationship: 1. A contract exists which delineates the re sponsibilities and obligations of both parties. 2. A strong continuing cooperative relationship exists between them. 3. The franchisee operates the business sub stantially under the trade name and market ing plan of the franchisor. This definition would encompass manufacturer retailer franchisors' (the automobile and oil com panies), manufacturer-wholesaler franchisors (the soft-drink companies), wholesaler-retailer fran chisors (the voluntary chains in food retailing), and the service sponsor-retailer (fast food sys tems).
Purported Favorable Consequences of Franchising
Franchising advocates claim many favorable consequences of the franchise system of distri bution. A review of the literature suggests that the following favorable consequences are most often attributed to franchising. The present study concluded that franchisees believe they are independent businessmen since they perceive themselves to have primary respon sibility for six out of seven key operating areas, such as determining hours of operation, book keeping, local advertising, pricing, standards of cleanliness, and number of employees. s Only in "determining additions and deletions to the prod uct line" did franchisees indicate that the pri mary responsibility belongs to the franchisor.
Even if franchisees are to be considered inde pendent businessmen, the claim that franchising creates new businesses would not be valid if a high percentage of franchisees would have gone into business for themselves without a franchising arrangement. This study provided several esti mates of the net effect of franchising on the cre ation of new businesses. The mean of these esti mates was 52%;9 that is, if franchising did not exist, approximately 52% of those franchisees studied would not be self-employed. The data sug gest that franchising does make a substantial con tribution to the creation of small new businesses. Since owning their business has long been a legitimate aspiration of a large segment of the populatiqn; since the entry of large numbers of competitiors in various industries heightens com petition; and since much of the stated national policy favors small businesses (as exemplified by the Small Business Administration, programs to save the family farm. and the intended purpose of such legislation as the Robinson-Patman Act), a distribution system which encourages the forma tion of new businesses would seem desirable.
Franchised businesses have lower failure rates than other businesses.
In a "mixed" free enterprise economic system the discipline of the marketplace results in the survival of the most efficient members. However, business failures bring about wasted resources, economic disruption, and at least temporary un employment. If franchising does lower the busi ness failure rate by increasing marketing efficiency through superior management techniques, this would be both a socially and economically de sirable outcome.
Although a low failure rate for franchised busi nesses has been frequently cited,lo the only "hard" evidence comes from a study conducted by Atkin Franchising may well be the only feasible alternative to the increasing vertical integration of so many segments of our economy. It may well be one of the most promising hopes for the preservation of the independent small business man in our society.l4 It does appear that economic concentration would be greater if· franchisors owned all their currently franchised units. For example, if the automobile manufacturers owned all their dealer ships, their assets would increase by the substan tial sum of $4 billion.Hi However, the major issue is whether franchising is a permanent form of distribution or whether firms use franchising as a temporary system of distribution in order to raise enough capital to form completely integrated chains. Some theorists have postulated that fran chise systems will ultimately become wholly owned chains,16 and the "buy-back" policies of many fast food franchisors suggest that they may not view franchising as a permanent form of dis tributionP The National Association of Automo bile Dealers has expressed concern over the for ward integration of automobile manufacturers into automobile retailing:
Manufacturers have assured their dealers and NADA that they have no inclination or desire to n. supplant their franchisees with direct retail out lets of their own. Let me point out, however, that an alarming number of manufacturer owned retail establishments have been set up in various metropolitan areas throughout the country. Since the great majority of new motor vehicles are sold in these population centers, the manufacturer can, by increasing his direct sales outlets, control the major markets.l 8 The present research indicated that the ratio of franchised units to company-operated units in fast food franchise chains diminished from 81 to 1 in 1960 to only 10 to 1 in 1970 despite the fact that these were years of rapid growth for franchising. New restrictive legislation at both the state and federal levels may also push many franchisors toward company-operated units.1 9 This legislation, which forces franchisors to submit to time-con suming and expensive state registration proce dures and which regulates the provisions of the franchise contract (with special attention to ter mination provisions), may convince many fran chisors that franchising is a less desirable method for expansion than company-operated units. If the trend toward company-operated units con tinues, the benefit of decreasing economic con centration may prove largely illusory.
Franchising provides opportunities for minori
ty group members to own their own business. Franchising appears to offer potential business opportunities to minority group members because of the substantial advantages of franchise systems, such as well-known trade names, training pro grams, capital assistance, and continued manage ment counseling. Unforttplately, this is reflected more in future promise than present reality. The present study showed that minority group mem bers hold only 1.5 0 /0 of fast food franchises, al though they make up about 16% of the total popu lation. Other studies have also demonstrated the low participation of minority groups in fran chising. w Although special industry and government pro grams 21 this lack of success appear to be financial, edu cational, and cultural:
(a) Blacks frequently do not have the financial resources necessary to purchase a franchise, and franchisors customarily do not have the financial capacity to subsidize large numbers of black fran chisees. Also, franchisors have experienced long delays in obtaining governmental assistance in financing minority group franchisees. 22 (b) Blacks frequently lack basic managerial skills, and the typical two-week training program of most franchisors would not be adequate to teach these skills.2Il
(c) Success among blacks has frequently cen tered on the professions of law, medicine, teach ing, and the ministry. Blacks frequently do not respond to franchising advertising because they simply do not aspire to be independent business men. 24 5. Franchising assists consumers by providing standardized products to an increasingly mo bile public. Franchisees,25 franchisors,26 and academicians 27 have all suggested that the uniform quality of products of franchise systems constitutes a: bene fit to the mobile consumer. However, two ques tions frame this issue: (a) Do consumers really want the standardized products of franchise sys tems; and (b) if consumers do want standardized products, can other systems of distribution pro vide them? The financial success of hundreds of franchise systems yields impressive evidence that large segments of the population desire standard ized products, and thus the marketplace has re solved the first question.
The issue of alternative systems is not so easily resolved. Certainly, corporate chains with their company-operated units can provide standardized products. Uniformity of business operation is, in fact, easier to obtain with company-operated units than with a franchise system; franchisees must be persuaded to promote uniformity, whereas company managers can be told to do so.. This has caused some firms to avoid franchising:
Better management control is another reason that we have company-owned stores. I saw a recent situation where a franchise competitor wanted to change his prices and he went through considerable turmoil in order to con vince his franchise operators to go along with the price increase. He ended up changing some of the prices, not all of them, and he is still working on the problem of raising prices. Poli cies, graphics, advertising, merchandising, quali ty control, remodeling repairs-how do you con vince a franchise dealer that even if a store is only ten years old, he must invest more of his money for remodeling?28 Therefore, although consumers apparently want standardized products conveniently available, the franchise system of distribution offers no par ticular advantage in this regard vis-a.-vis corporate chains with company-operated units. However, many firms lack the capital to expand via compa ny-operated units, and franchising may promote standardized products by providing these firms with a low-cost method for expansion.
Purported Unfavorable Consequences of Franchising
Not all commentators on franchising are favor able. Franchising critics purport that there are numerous unfavorable aspects to franchising. Many of their diverse criticisms can be grouped under the three major dysfunctional consequences which follow.
1. Franchising is an anticompetitive system of dis trib ution. Two elements basic to franchising are the co operation between franchisor and franchisee, and the control the franchisor exerts over the fran chisee's activities. When does legal cooperation become illegal collusion, and when do franchisor assistances become anticompetitive, promonopoly controls? Tying agreements, territorial restric tions, and pricing policies have all been focal points for charges that franchising is anticom petitive.
Four court decisions address the issue of wheth er a franchisor's control over his franchisee's purchasing decisions constitutes an illegal tying agreement. In the Brown Shoe 29 case, Brown's plan of offering valuable busine~s assistance, such as architectural plans and inexpensive group in surance, to its dealers in exchange for their con centration on the Brown Shoe line was held to be an illegal tying agreement. Similarly, the Su preme Court held in Atlantic RefiningS o that At lantic could not force its independent dealers to carry Goodyear TBA-tires, batteries, and acces sories. since Carvel franchised an entire soft ice cream business, it could reasonably require its fran chisees to buy all ingredients of the end product from Carvel or Carvel-designated sources in order to insure quality control and to protect the trade mark. Nevertheless, the quality control defense was rejected in the Chicken Delight 32 case be cause the court reasoned that any competent man ufacturer could produce the paper goods that the Chicken Delight franchisees were required to pur chase from their franchisor.
Two cases buttress the anticompetitive charge concerning territorial restrictions. In the Schwinn 38 case, a bicycle manufacturer required its franchised distributors to sell only to fran chised retailers in assigned territories. In turn, the franchised retailers were not allowed to sell to other retailers; e.g., discount houses. The court held the practice illegal per se, since it ob jected to "the making of any sales to retailers upon any condition, agreement, or understanding limiting the retailer's freedom as to whom he will resell the products."34 Similarly, in the General Motors 35 case the court held that GM could not collude with its dealers in the Los Angeles area to prevent certain franchised dealers from selling to nonfranchised (discount) outlets since this rep resented a classic conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Price-fixing charges against franchising gain support from Albrecht and Sealy.36 In Albrecht, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat's policy of specify ing the maximum price at which its franchised dealers could sell its newspapers was held illegal per se. A similar per se violation was the agree ment between Sealy, a bedding trademark owner, and its franchisees to establish uniform prices. Practices similar to those discussed above, and which may be in violation of antitrust statutes, remain commonplace in franchising. For example, 50% of 117 responding fast food franchisors. in the sample indicated that they did "specify the prices of the franchisee's products." Similarly, 28% required the franchisee to purchase his paper goods from the franchisor, and 85% assigned an exclusive territory to their franchisees.
The vigorous prosecution of purported anticom petitive practices in franchising has prompted some commentators to forecast doom:
The ultimate consequences of this decision cause many larger manufacturers to vertically integrate their distribution channels in order to retain control over the manner in which their products compete with other, similiar products. . . . This movement could leave many small manufacturers at a decided competitive disad vantage, and could dry up the source of supply for many. distributors and retailers. This con cept of competition, currently fashionable in Washington, could cause serious injury to the very types of business it seeks to protect. The socioeconomic effect on ultimate consumers of increased intrabrand competition, or, at the op posite extreme, increased vertical integration, is conjectura1. 37 Franchisors go to great lengths to substantiate the claim that franchisees are not employees, but rather "independent businessmen."38 Of the 121 fast food contracts sampled, 64% specifically stated that the franchisee is neither an agent nor an employee of the franchisor. Antitrust laws gen erally restrict groups of independent businessmen from certain activities that are routine in em ployer-employee relationships; e.g., setting uni· form prices. Franchising advocates apparently want it both ways; they want franchisees to be considered independent and, at the same time, re quest speCial treatment under the antitrust laws. The courts have shown and probably will continue to show no tendency to accord such special treat ment to franchising.
Franchise agreements are one-sided in favor of
protecting the prerogatives of franchisors.
As evidence that franchise agreements are un fair, critics cite franchise termination clauses which allow the franchisor to put the franchisee out of business because of trivial violations of the agreement. 39 The present study found that over half of the franchise contracts incorporated as a part of the agreement the operating manual (a manual detailing specific procedures for oper ating the business). Since the provisions of the operating manual can be changed at the preroga tive of the franchisor, the franchisees find them selves in the tenuous position of being bound to a contract that can be modified unilaterally by the Similar charges of unfair agreements stem from "covenants not to compete," which prohibit the franchisee from practicing his trade for a speci fied time period within a specific geographical area after his franchise is terminated. 4o Sixty per cent of the sample contracts had such clauses. Other clauses cited as onerous include requiring the franchisee to buy supplies and equipment from the franchisor, severely restricting the fran chisee's right to sell the franchise, prohibiting the franchisee from joining any association (union) of franchisees, and the lack of arbitration clauses (only 23% of the agreements studied had pro cedures for arbitrating disputes between fran chisee and franchisor).41
Franchising advocates point out that franchisees and franchisors are businessmen, and, as such, they should be free to negotiate any contract even one which is strongly. one-sided. They con tend that the doctrine of sanctity of contract re mains valid, and that the courts have upheld and will probably continue to uphold the provisions of contracts entered into freely.42
Critics counter that franchise agreements, far from being negotiated contracts, are actually con tracts of adhesion where the potential franchisee must agree to adhere to the standard contract if he wishes to buy a franchise. 43 Critics view franchise agreements as comparable to insurance policies which, similarly, are sold, not negotiated. 44 Many franchisors can offer. the franchise contract on a "take it or leave it" basis because (1) po tential franchisees have been presold on fran chising through numerous "rags to riches" articles in the popular press; (2) the potential franchisee is at an extreme negotiating disadvantage in not knowing which of the franchisor's claims about the profitability of the franchise are fact and which are puffery; and (3) the franchisor's law yers are likely to be much more sophisticated at drafting franchise agreements than the fran chisee's attorney. Frequently, franchisees are not represented by counsel at all; almost 40% of the sample of franchisees had not consulted a lawyer before signing the agreement. Three types of unethical selling practices have occurred in franchising: (a) "Pyramid" distri bution schemes; (b) the use of a celebrity's name in promoting a franchise; and (c) misrepresenting the potential profitability of the franchises. A pyramid distribution scheme is a contemporary business variant of the chain-letter device. In vestors purchase the right to sell subdistributor ships. These subdistributors, in turn, sell other distributorships. Often, very little of the product ever changes hands since the real profit lies in the sale of distributorships. Representatives of the U.S. Post Office Department claim:
The pyramid-type chain promotion in the fraud ulent sale of franchises is perhaps the most in sidious devised to date. It provides schemers with a limitless sucker list and can reach enor mous proportions' in a minimum length of time.
Its most thoroughly vicious feature is, of course, its self-perpetuating nature. An honest victim once ensnared might well, in turn, become dis honest and sell to others in order to recoup his losses, and on and on it goes. 45 The Federal Trade Commission has ~xpressed growing concern over pyramid schemes,46 and the Province of Ontario's Report of the Minister's Committee on Franchising has recommended leg islation to regulate such schemes. 47 Similarly, Wis consin has declared "chain distributor schemes" to be an unfair trade practice; consequently, they are prohibited. 48 Franchising critics charge that using a celebri ty's name to promote the sale of a franchise also represents an unsavory practice in selling fran chises:
In many cases the companies involved either sponsor or are sponsored by leading personali ties in the entertainment or sports worlds. The franchisee is likely to believe that such persons would not lend their names to endeavors unless they were sound and respectable ones. Again such is not the case. incumbent upon a franchisor who promotes the sale of his franchise by wide-spread publiCity which associates the franchise with a public figure or celebrity to fully disclose the nature of any financial or business relationship be tween the franchisor and the public figure prior to any sale of the franchise. 5O The widespread use of the celebrity franchise system seems to have waned. Few new celebrity systems are being started, and many of the present systems which have relied heavily on the drawing power of a celebrity name have experienced se vere financial problems. 51 One reason for the de cline of celebrity franchising is that potential franchisees are now wary of buying a celebrity franchise as a result of numerous articles in the popular press which have widely publicized the problems associated with this kind of franchise.
The third charge of unethical selling practices relates to franchisors misrepresenting the poten tial profitability of their franchises. Although there have been many allegations of misrepresen tation 52 and some specific actions taken by the Federal Trade Commission against individual fran chisors,58 until now there has been little evidence of widespread, systematic misrepresentation.
The present study obtained the pro-forma in come statements which 67 fast food franchisors show to prospective franchisees as profit projec tions. The study also had detailed profit data from 282 franchises associated with chains who use the pro-forma income statements in sales pro motions. The results were dramatic: 73 0 lb of the franchisees had incomes below the minimum pro jected by the pro-forma statements; 92% had in comes below the average projected figures; and 99% had incomes below the maximum projected incomes. Little doubt remains that many fran chisors are systematically misleading prospective franchisees as to the potential profitability of their franchised businesses.
Summary
Significant evidence exists that franchising has a net positive effect on the creation of new busi nesses. Franchising decreases economic concen tration, but this positive advantage may be fleet ing if the trend toward company-operated units continues. Similarly, although franchising pro vides standardized products for mobile consumers, corporate chains with company-operated units can often accomplish the same result. No "hard" evidence supports the assertion that franchised businesses have lower failure rates than other businesses. Although franchising may" in the fu ture bring significant numbers of minority group members into the mainstream of economic ac tivity, present and past performance in this re gard has been nominal.
On the negative side, many common practices in franchising, such as price collusion and tying agreements, have been struck down by recent court decisions as violations of antitrust statutes. Under current antitrust legislation, the franchise system of distribution is unlikely to receive spe cial exemption.
The onerous provisions in many franchise agree ments provide powerful evidence that they are one-sided contracts of adhesion rather than bal anced, negotiated agreements. The legitimate grievances of franchisees in this area may be partially redressed by both state and federal legis lation. 54 Although many franchising critics have articulated the need for general "good faith and fair dealing" legislation,55 the proposed federal legislation is restricted primarily to protecting the franchisee from arbitrary termination by the franchisor.
Substantial evidence also exists that franchisors are not disclosing adequate information about their franchises in order for potential" franchisees to carefully evaluate franchise offerings. In par ticular, many franchisors are systematically mis leading prospective franchisees as to the potential profitability of their franchised businesses. Once again, both state and federal legislation has been proposed to require franchisors to make full dis closure of all pertinent information to potential franchisees prior to the signing of the agreement.56
On balance, the net socioeconomic consequences of the franchise system of distribution appear to be positive. There remain abuses and dysfunc tional consequences associated with franchising, but these are amenable to resolution through the courts or through new legislation. A closing caveat, however; proposed remedial legislation must be carefully drafted to prevent the crippling of a system of distribution which plays such a major role in our economy. 
